Municipal Corner

Conflicts Between the City of Austin’s Proposed Energy Code and the Texas Utilities Code. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0521 (2026).

The Attorney General evaluated a possible conflict between provisions in the City of Austin’s (“the City”) Energy Code and the Utilities Code.

The City’s Energy Code requires the installation of “electric ready” infrastructure in buildings with equipment or appliances that use natural gas for space heating, service water heating, cooking, clothes drying or lighting. Subsection 181.903(b) of the Utilities Code prohibits the City of Austin from adopting or enforcing a code that has the purpose, intent, or effect of directly or indirectly discriminating against a utility service based on the type or source of energy.

The City’s Energy Code could conflict with the Utilities Code by having “the purpose, intent, or effect of directly or indirectly . . . discriminating against” a utility service “based on the type or source of energy.” By looking at the common meaning of the word “discriminate,” the Attorney General found it clear that the City’s Energy Code has the “purpose, intent, or effect of directly
or indirectly” discriminating against natural gas utility services. As a result, the Attorney General concluded that the Utility Code’s broad prohibition renders the City’s ordinance unenforceable.

County Employment Practices. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0522 (2026).

In response to a request by the Stephens County Commissioners Court, the Attorney General opined regarding several aspects of the role of a commissioners court in employment matters.

The opinion notes that a commissioners court is the county’s principal governing body exercising only such powers as the law specifically confers. Other elected officials also manage and control county affairs. A commissioners court may not usurp or unreasonably interfere with an official’s sphere of authority.

While recognizing there may be instances when an elected official must publicly advertise an employment position, the Attorney General found no general statute that imposes such a requirement on county elected officials. The Attorney General cautioned that the Stephens County Commissioners Court may use an elected official’s failure to advertise a position or decision to advertise in a limited area as evidence to assert that hiring practices are discriminatory.

The opinion further observed that a commissioners court may not dictate a person be hired or override an elected official’s decision about who to hire because the commissioners court has no legal right to screen applicants for a position in the office of an elected official.

The commissioners court determines the number of employees that may be appointed by a district, county, or precinct officer and sets the salaries of most county employees. Courts have upheld a commissioners court’s mid-year reduction of an elected official’s staff and salaries pursuant to the commissioners court’s authority to amend the budget; however, a commissioners court may not, for instance, reduce an elected official’s staff or salaries “in a manner that prevents the elected officer from performing the duties of office” or in contravention of a law that “governs the compensation for the” particular staff position.

As related to timekeeping, the Attorney General found that the Stephens County Commissioners Court does not have implicit authority to require an elected official’s employees use a certain method of timekeeping, such as a time clock.

A county’s commissioners court has the authority to confer employment benefits like vacation and sick leave upon county officers and employees. However, it is generally up to an elected county official to approve what activities constitute a legitimate use of an employee’s official time, like work time rather than vacation time. The Local Government Code authorizes a commissioners court to establish a sick leave pool from which an eligible employee, facing catastrophic injury or illness, may draw when the employee exhausts all accrued paid leave and compensatory time to which the employee is entitled. The commissioners court must restrict the amount of time an employee may contribute to and withdraw from the pool as provided in this subchapter.

The opinion further concludes that the authority to discipline or terminate an employee who works for an elected official generally lies with the elected official, and a commissioners court may not usurp or unreasonably interfere with an elected county officer’s authority to require a bond for the officer’s deputies, assistants, and clerks.
The Attorney General also stated that in some circumstances, it may be inadvisable for a single employee to serve multiple county officials as this practice may violate the prohibition against a commissioners court influencing the appointment of a deputy, assistant, or clerk.

Lisa Silveira is an Associate in the Firm’s Districts and Water Practice Groups. If you would like additional information, please contact Lisa at 512.322.5880 or lsilveira@lglawfirm.com.