Municipal Corner

Hey, Stop Barking! AG Resolves Question on Municipal Ordinances Regulating Excessive Dog Barking. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0491 (2025).

The Bandera County Commissioners Court (“Commissioners Court”) requested an opinion from the Texas Attorney General to resolve whether a county commissioners court has the authority to enact an order penalizing a dog owner for causing a public nuisance due to the dog’s excessive barking. In 2009, Bandera County adopted an order that defined a public nuisance to include allowing an animal to bark excessively near the private residence of another. Since that order failed to establish consequences for an owner causing a nuisance, the Commissioners Court modified the 2009 order, adopting a 2022 order that penalized dog owners with up to a misdemeanor offense for committing the public nuisance.

The Attorney General first analyzed Bandera County’s authority under Article V, Section 18(b) of the Texas Constitution. While county commissioners courts have the authority to exercise power over “county business,” the term “county business” does not represent an immediate grant of general power, but rather a limit on the Legislature’s ability to confer power on a commissioners court. Though the state government and municipalities possess general police power, a county does not. Ultimately, the legal basis for a commissioners court’s actions must come from statutes or the Texas Constitution.

The Commissioners Court contended its 2022 order was valid under the Rabies Control Act of 1981. To control and prevent the spread of rabies, the Act authorizes commissioners courts to adopt ordinances to require that each dog be “restrained” by its owner, making failure to “restrain” punishable as a misdemeanor. The Commissioners Court argued that requiring an owner to “restrain” excessive barking was within the scope of the term, and therefore the county order was permitted under the Act.

The Attorney General disagreed with this argument after considering a dictionary’s definition of the word “restrain” and the Act’s other uses of the term. According to the dictionary, to “restrain” means to deprive of liberty, with liberty meaning freedom from physical restraint. The Act’s references to the term “restrain” focus on an animal’s movement, as evidenced by the term “quarantine,” which refers to physical confinement. The term “restrain,” therefore, does not include barking within its scope because the term contemplates freedom of movement rather than producing noise. The Commissioners Court must accept this definition instead of attempting to expand its meaning beyond the intended scope. Consequently, absent statutory or constitutional authority, a county commissioners court lacks the authority to enact an order penalizing a dog owner for a public nuisance due to the dog’s excessive barking.

AG Reviews the Authority of Commissioners Court to Transfer Funding Away from County Attorney’s Office. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0492 (2025).

The Commissioners Court requested an opinion from the Texas Attorney General to resolve whether the Commissioners Court has the authority to transfer funding or positions away from the county attorney’s office and create a new legal support position. The Commissioners Court sought to move the contract and procurement specialist position and its funding from the Aransas County Attorney’s Office (“County Attorney”) to the Aransas County Auditor’s Office (“Auditor”). Additionally, the Commissioners Court sought to create a new attorney position exclusively for its own use by defunding an existing attorney position within the County Attorney’s Office.

The Attorney General first provided background on the general authority of a county commissioners court and county officials. A commissioners court has express statutory authority to oversee the fiscal operations of the county, which includes broad discretion over authorizing a budget and making personnel funding decisions. However, state law prohibits a commissioners court from interfering with or usurping other elected county officers’ sphere of authority. A sphere of authority consists of an officer’s core duties as defined by statutes and the Texas Constitution. A commissioners court may delegate a function to an appropriate county official if it is not exclusively assigned to a particular county official as a core duty.

The question, therefore, is whether the duties of the contract and procurement specialist are core duties of the County Attorney. When a county is included in a district with a district attorney, the Texas Constitution states that the respective duties of county attorneys be regulated by the Legislature. Here, the Legislature assigned the duties imposed on district attorneys by general law to the Aransas County Attorney, which includes representing the state in all criminal cases before the district courts of that attorney’s district. Because the County Attorney has not been assigned the exclusive authority to oversee county procurement processes or manage county contracts as part of their legal and regulatory requirements, the Commissioners Court can reassign the contract and procurement specialist position to the Auditor without usurping the County Attorney’s authority. Since the Commissioners Court enjoys broad discretion over the legislative function of making budgetary decisions, the Commissioners Court is also free to decide whether funding associated with the contract and procurement specialist position should be reassigned from the County Attorney to the Auditor.

Similarly, so long as the Commissioners Court does not usurp the statutory duties of other county officials, the Commissioners Court has the authority to create a new attorney position exclusively for its own use, such as a new attorney position.

When a commissioners court sets the budget for a given year, the commissioners court may reconsider whether a funded position is still necessary. Since the Commissioners Court did not describe the duties of the existing civil attorney position, however, the Attorney General declined to assess whether defunding a civil attorney position would usurp the County Attorney’s core duties. Generally, a commissioners court may exercise its budgeting power so long as it does not abuse its discretion or usurp the core duties of the elected county officials.

Who Has a Say? AG Considers Who Can Participate in Zoning Disputes. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0498 (2025).

The Texas State Senate requested an opinion from the Texas Attorney General to resolve three questions for the City of San Antonio regarding municipal zoning procedures set out in the Texas Local Government Code. The first question is whether property owners within 200 feet of a proposed zoning change, whether inside or outside city limits, are entitled to notification of the change, regardless of their presence on municipal tax rolls. The second question is whether property owners within a designated radius have the right to protest a proposed zoning change, regardless of their presence on municipal tax rolls. The third question asks for clarification on the procedural requirements and use of external records for verifying eligibility concerning notification and protest of a proposed zoning change.

Zoning changes generally involve both the municipality’s zoning commission and the governing body. The City of San Antonio, however, is a home-rule municipality in which the governing body does not meet jointly with the zoning commission. The Attorney General limited its opinion accordingly.

The first question concerns a landowner’s right to individual written notice of a public hearing before the zoning commission regarding a proposed zoning change. The Texas Local Government Code states that any person or entity listed as the owner of property located within 200 feet of the proposed change is entitled to notice if their ownership is recorded in the municipality’s current tax roll. The current tax roll, therefore, establishes whether notice is owed to a given person or entity.

The second question concerns the zoning change process involving the governmental body, such as a municipality, rather than the zoning commission. Under the Texas Local Government Code, a landowner does not need to be listed on the current municipal tax roll to count toward the protest calculation. According to the statute, the term “owner” can include those not listed on the tax roll, and this is consistent with a plain reading of the text. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 211.007(a-c). The Attorney General concluded the Texas Supreme Court, after an analysis of the statute and its history, would likely agree that ownership within the qualifying geographical area satisfies the protest calculation criteria, regardless of an owner’s presence on the current tax roll.

The third question requests clarification on the standard procedural requirements for verifying a property owner’s eligibility for notification and protest purposes. As the responses to the previous questions explain, an owner’s presence on the current tax roll determines whether an owner has a right to written notice, but not whether an owner counts for purposes of calculating a protest. Besides the current tax roll, the Texas Local Government Code neither directs nor prohibits the use of other external records or sets out specific procedures for verifying property ownership. The Attorney General explained that such procedural requirements are typically found in local zoning ordinances. Absent a judicial finding of abuse of discretion, local zoning ordinances and other local regulations determine the method used to verify an owner and provide guidance on whether external records may be used to verify ownership.

Jake Steen is an Associate in the Firm’s Water, Districts, and Litigation Practice Groups. If you would like additional information or have questions related to these or other matters, please contact Jake at 512.322.5811 or jsteen@lglawfirm.com.