Municipal Corner

Scope of municipalities’ authority to enter into intergovernmental support agreements with U.S. military installations. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0527 (2026).

The City of Socorro asked the Attorney General to consider whether a home-rule municipality may legally enter into an intergovernmental support agreement (IGSA) with a federal military installation. The City has tentatively agreed to perform custodial services for the United States Army Garrison Fort Bliss, Texas in exchange for payment.

Home-rule municipalities, like the City of Socorro, are unique government entities that derive their power from the Texas Constitution “subject to and may be limited only by their charters or by the Constitution or by general law.” However, such cities may choose to take advantage of a statutory framework like IGSAs and become subject to the legislative limitations imposed by that framework. As a result, home-rule municipalities that wish to enter into an IGSA must act consistently with the state statutory framework.

Section 793.002 of the Government Code allows local governments to enter into IGSAs “with a branch of the armed forces of the United States… to provide installation-support services to a military installation located in this state.” An IGSA is limited to those “installation-support services” that the providing party “already provides… for its own use.” Moreover, article VIII, § 3 of the Texas Constitution limits IGSAs to “public purposes.” A “public purpose” includes expenditures that serve “one of the municipality’s powers or functions” even if it “incidentally benefits a private person.”

The Attorney General concluded that the City’s IGSA is likely lawful, because, generally, such an agreement with a military installation can increase “the efficiency and effectiveness of local governments.”

Whether a school district trustee must resign upon announcing candidacy for justice of the peace and related compatibility questions. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0529 (2026).

The Attorney General examined whether a school district trustee must resign upon announcing candidacy for justice of the peace.

Specifically, the Attorney General reviewed article XVI, §§ 40, 65 of the Texas Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the common-law doctrine of incompatibility for language prohibiting an individual from holding both offices. He found that article XVI, §§ 40, 65 and the Code of Judicial Conduct are inapplicable to school board trustees.

The common-law doctrine of incompatibility provides that “one person cannot simultaneously hold two incompatible offices.” Offices are incompatible “when one position appoints or employs the other” or when “a person holding one office could impose that office’s policies on the other or subject it to control in some other way.” The Attorney General notes this does not prohibit a person from running for office while still occupying another office. Additionally, he concluded that a person may hold the office of justice of the peace and school board trustee, because they are not incompatible with each other and the justice of the peace may simply recuse himself or herself.

House Bill 4490 and the confidentiality of next of kin information under Article 49.25 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0530 (2026).

The Bexar County Criminal District Attorney requested that the Attorney General advise on whether House Bill 4490 exempts county medical examiners from releasing “information relating to the next of kin of a decedent.”

Article 49.25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs medical examiners. House Bill 4490 added subsection 11(d), which exempts next-of-kin information from required public disclosure in accordance with the Public Information Act (PIA). However, the information remains “subject to disclosure under subpoena or authority of other law.” Given this, the Attorney General concluded that Article 49.25 exempts next-of-kin information from mandatory disclosure but does not make the information confidential.

Therefore, a government entity can withhold the information from PIA disclosure, though it is not confidential in other matters. Furthermore, the Attorney General concludes that information indirectly identifying next-of-kin constitutes information “relating to” next-of-kin.

Commissioners Court authority to approve and make purchases without approval of the County Auditor. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0531 (2026).

The Kinney County Auditor requested that the Attorney General advise on whether the Commissioners Court has authority to approve and make purchases without approval of the County Auditor.

The Commissioners Court “may not authorize the payment of goods and services without the approval of the county auditor, but the [auditor] may not arbitrarily withhold approval.” Moreover, subsection 113.064(a) of the Texas Local Government Code does not preclude a county auditor from auditing a claim for payment of goods or services before the county receives them. Lastly, a county auditor may audit and approve a county’s “purchase of a vehicle without a signed requisition, provided that the purchase otherwise complies with the law governing county finances.”

Eligibility for service as a commissioner on a governing board of an emergency services district under Health & Safety Code § 775.034. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0533 (2026).

The Attorney General examined whether Chapter 775 of the Health and Safety Code or any “conflict-of-interest or incompatibility doctrines” prohibit officers or employees of a contracting municipality “from simultaneously serving as an… [emergency services district] commissioner or in another official or advisory capacity.”

Chapter 775’s conflict-of-interest provisions target only private financial conflicts. Therefore, the Attorney General reasoned that a person may serve simultaneously as a municipal officer or employee and as an emergency services district officer or employee without violating Chapter 775’s conflict-of-interest provisions.

Constitutional dual-officeholding restrictions may prohibit an individual from holding a compensated municipal office and a compensated emergency services district office, depending on the nature of the two positions. When the municipal and emergency services district positions both possess the authority to contract with the other government entity, the conflicting loyalties aspect of common law incompatibility generally renders the two offices incompatible.

Municipal authority over certain firefighter positions under the Texas Local Government Code. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0536 (2026).

The Attorney General examined whether the Texas Local Government Code grants a municipality authority over certain firefighter positions.

The Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Act secures “efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” The Act defines “[f]ire fighter” as “a member of a fire department who was appointed in substantial compliance with” Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. The Act applies to certain municipalities with “a population of 10,000 or more” that “ha[ve] a paid fire department or police department[] and… ha[ve] voted to adopt” the Act.

The Act requires municipalities to establish “classifications” for firefighters by ordinance. In doing so, the municipality’s governing body can “create new positions or, within certain limitations, abolish them.” A municipality abolishing a civil service position must demonstrate that it was in good faith and “would be more satisfactory to the public in general, that it will result in something more than monetary savings, and that the duties of the classified personnel were not merely transferred to others.”

Moreover, a municipality’s civil service commission and department head has “authority… to vacate classified firefighter positions under certain circumstances.” The Act allows department heads to promote firefighters, thus vacating the position previously filled by that firefighter. For municipalities with populations less than 1.5 million people, the department head may also indefinitely suspend or permanently dismiss a firefighter under their supervision or jurisdiction in certain circumstances. In compliance with procedures set forth in the Act, a municipality may also fill vacant classified firefighter positions.

Whether a Type A general law city may accept a donation of property, including money, for municipal purposes. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0537 (2026).

Hill County requested that the Attorney General advise on whether a Type A general law city may accept a donation of property, including money, for municipal purposes.

A general-law municipality’s authority to accept donations must be found in, or implied from, state law. Subsection 51.015(a) of the Local Government Code provides that “[t]o carry out a municipal purpose” a Type A general-law municipality “may take, hold, purchase, lease, grant, or convey property located in or outside the municipality.” Subsection 51.011 provides that this subchapter “applies only to a Type A general-law municipality.”

The Attorney General found that “property” in this subsection includes money. In addition, the terms “hold” and “purchase” do not grant the authority to accept property under subsection 51.015(a), but the term “take” grants the authority to accept property. Therefore, subsection 51.015(a) provides Type A general-law municipalities with the authority to accept donations of property, including money, so long as it is done for a municipal purpose.

Sofia Carrillo, P.E. is an Associate in the Firm’s Water, Districts, and Litigation Practice Groups. If you would like additional information, please contact Sofia at 512.322.5812 or scarrillo@lglawfirm.com.